Concerning majority governs morals, that is silly. So if the majority starts burning "so called witches" is that right? Or if the majority starts killing Jews, Kurds etc. then that is ok? Don’t think so. If the majority starts saying it is ok to murder are you going to do it? Is our thinking and morals really subject to someone else’s opinions? Do you do what others tell you to do because they say it is right? I would hope not!
Also, I am willing to bet that if you found a tribe that has had absolutely no contact without the outside world and you asked them if it was ok to murder their wives, unananimously it would be no! So, where again did this moral law come from? It’s not from society because society has no impact on those that don’t associate with it. So please someone answer this question that i proposed in another thread that is again and again avoided.
Morality is a vague term and can become too ambiguous to speak of in a technical sense. Therefore I shall operationalize the term, defined as “the particular practices, precepts, and customs of people and cultures” (Di Leo, 2002). This definition reflects the source of morality which is the culture, a product of a social group. This also alludes to the origins of what we would call “morals” within an evolutionary framework:
Affiliative behaviors probably evolved in vertebrates, from basic patterns of parental nurturance. Kin selection theory suggests that the altruism that was directed from parents to offspring could easily evolve to be directed to other related individuals. Once group living organisms had reached a certain level of complexity, altruistic acts could be directed toward non-kin with the understanding that the assisted individuals would return the favor. Gratitude, sympathy, trust, suspicion, and guilt can be viewed as adaptation that facilitate the functioning of the highly evolved reciprocal altruism system of humans (188) (Palmer and Palmer, 2002).
The appearance of such behaviors was advantageous for grouped primates. There is strength and safety in numbers. For our ancestors, this became a major survival tool. Those who displayed traits conducive to survival of the group were kept, those who did not were ostracized most likely and their genetics were not kept in the gene pool (Evans and Zarate, 1999). Because of this selection of group-beneficial predispositions in behavior, we have inherited those predispositions in our genetics and they are usually expressed in what we would term “universal morals” – something many often cite as evidence of a deity, however it is explained well by evolutionary means (Barkow, Tooby and Cosmides, 1992). There has been research which supports a biological basis for morality such as universal taboos like incest (Lieberman, Tooby and Cosmides, 2003).
The formation of a social group aids in the ability to repel predators, help in the acquisition of food resources and the protection of offspring. Within the formation of these social groups, interaction is impossible to avoid. The groups became essential for survival of our ancestors and to help ensure that the species would continue to grow and thrive.
However, living within groups can have its consequences:
...with lots of other conspecifics around you, all with the same food preferences, competition becomes more intense. Squabbles for scare food resources become common (Evans and Zarate, 63).
The consequence of this problem was the formation of alliances with others which share common interests or goals. This splintering of the larger social unit gave way to a huge social group which is divided into smaller groups of individuals in alliances to achieve the same goals. This was the beginning catalyst for the formation of what we have become to know as morals.
Steven Pinker (2002), in his book The Blank Slate comments on three features of the group of cooperators:
One is the cognitive wherewithal to figure out how the world works. This yields know-how worth sharing and an ability to spread goods and information over larger territories, both of which expand opportunities for gains in trade. A second is language, which allows technology to be shared, bargains to be struck, and agreements to be enforced. A third is emotional repertoire – sympathy, trust, guilt, anger, self-esteem – that impels us to seek new cooperators, maintain relationships with them, and safeguard the relationships against possible exploitation. Long ago these endowments put our species on a moral escalator (168).
As with all other social groups, hierarchies would form and the most dominant individuals would keep control and delegate responsibilities. The enforcement of the traits of which the group would find acceptable behavior became the enforce “guidelines” of being part of the group. These traits of behavior within this group would find those people of like mindedness and as a subsequence, of like genetic predispositions to that behavior. Reproduction carried out within these groups would preserve these hereditary predispositions for a certain behavior.
From the evolutionary/biological standpoint of genetic heredity, certain behaviors will persist in a population as long as the individuals carrying those genetics are able to reproduce viable offspring. Within the formation of groups, our ancestors found that it could better protect young and provide a safe place in which to reproduce. Those of the predispositions toward an isolationistic lifestyle and one away from the protection of a large group would soon find themselves at a loss. Without the aid of others, a loner would find it harder to find food, defend themselves from predators and harder to find a mate. With these overbearing problems, those who were prone to isolationism found themselves quickly excluded from the gene pool. This natural selection promoted the genetics for those who harbored tendencies toward social behaviors.
The sectionalization of the groups along with other environmental factors such as migration and geographic isolation contributed to the formation of the differentiated cultures as well as their differentiated morality and from that their moral codes of their cultures. The late Carl Sagan (1997) commented on such saying:
Moral codes that seek to regulate human behavior have been with us not only since the dawn of civilization but also among our pre-civilized, and highly social, hunter-gatherer ancestors (217).
The common formation through social groups and the division of smaller sub-groups into like-minded individuals provided the common ground for some of the moral items which seem to remain the same throughout different cultures and ethnic backgrounds. Items such as murder being considered “bad” or “immoral” seem to be universal among all cultures, which can be attributed to those early social groups.
The behavioral tendency to view murder as “wrong” was a trait of those ancestors to promote the general welfare of the group. Those who killed others in the group would quickly find themselves ejected from the group if not killed in return, the “eye for an eye” response which may have also originated either within the groups or interactions between two groups.
Common behavior is not just found in human groups but also with other primates as well. Robert Pennock (1999) agrees with the common genesis of morality stating:
...the commonalities we find with other primates is persuasive evidence that the intellectual and emotional characteristics that allow moral action in human beings are the result of our evolutionary development (115).
Social interaction also gave rise to means of cooperation and what is considered “good” behaviors within the group.
One of the most widely studied forms of pro-social behavior is altruism, or helping behavior that is performed voluntarily for the benefit of another person with no anticipation of reward (Walster and Piliavin, 1972 ).
Such behaviors within groups would be seen as beneficial and encouraged. Reciprocal altruism is a major player in social interactions of groups. The idea of reciprocal altruism is that if one does something for another, that individual is expected to do something in return for the other. By this practice a sort of trading of favors came about which promoted beneficial interactions not only within a group but between separate groups as well.
From the exchanging of favors comes a problem however, that known as the “free rider” problem, or those who accept favors but do not return the favor. As a consequence, a modified version of the exchange of favors arose.
Free riders who have refused to do return favors can be punished by refusing to do any more favors for them. Cooperators can be rewarded by continuing to help them when they need it. This simple strategy is called ‘tit-for-tat’. We punish free riding by refusing to cooperate (Evans and Zarate, 68-69).
Along with these social items the concept we know today as reputation also arose in respect to interactions. Those who had a “bad reputation” would find it increasingly difficult to form alliances and receive favors. This helps to eliminate the free rider problem and make certain that only “good” individuals prosper in the group. We can still see the group dynamics of reputation at work in smaller social groups – a quick peek at our evolutionary history in action (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004).
As the groups prospered and continued to grow and perpetuate themselves, change over time added to the complexity of the basic social interactions and “guidelines” of what is proper behavior within the group. The tendencies towards a socially aligned behavior were continually promoted and those against the group attitude were ostracized, basically speaking of course.
Much in the same vein, Freud (1961) mused:
...human life in common is only made possible when a majority comes together which is stronger than any separate individual and which remains united against all separate individuals (Freud 49).
Civilization progressed, human groups became large populations and the interactions became ever harder to keep track of in such large groups. However, with the “guidelines” still intact, societies decided to go further and began to set a sort of official “moral rules” within their populations. With the commonalities of their ancestors still with them, the “universal” ideas show up in most cultures and the variation can be seen as a product of the cultures special environment and their specific needs in order to promote the welfare of the population.
The behavior of how people interact with each other has become an extremely complex thing. Entire fields of science have been founded just to study the different aspects of the human social animal. Just as long as there have been social groups, there have been ideas of what is seen as “good” behavior or what is “best” to do within the group. The traits that led to what we call morals are nearly as old as the social aspect itself but it actually only a necessary product of the social construct.
The perseverance of certain behaviors thought of as “universal morals” is in actuality the result of natural selection and group interaction, and also explains why modern humans are so deeply social in nature. Some moral “guidelines” became actual codes of some cultures and even eventually evolved into what we think of as laws. Which, just like morals, have a common beginning but differ greatly in many aspects from country to country.
The human is often referred to as a “social animal”. From that social aspect came the genesis of morality. Therefore such a view might add credence to the assertion that man is a “moral animal” as well. Just as our social behaviors have evolved and become complex, so have our moral codes, guidelines and laws, which are often so complex that they come into contradiction with each other.
Also, in other animals we see evidence of sharing, protection of kin, instances of reciprocal altruism et cetera. We also have observed culture among other primates as well such as chimpanzees – our closest living relatives – and orangutans (van Schaik, Ancrenaz, Borgen, Galdikas, Knott, Singleton et al, 2003). Behaviors such as social conformity to the group which most would see as a uniquely human social trait has also been documented (Whiten, Horner, and de Waal, 2005).
As to the popular alternative view that morality is produced from a deity, such a view is called the Divine Command Theory. Divine Command Theory (DCT) basically states that what is good is whatever God commands it to be. Therefore, religion is necessary for morality. Morality is not contingent on religion or God(s). The whole idea is contradictory as pointed out as early back as Plato's dialogues.
The question is, as paraphrased from the Euthyphro dialogue is: (given there is/are God(s)) Does God command something because it's good or is it good because God commands it?
What of items that lay outside of those commands or condemnations? How about cannibalism for survival?
Arthur (1984) also points out:
If we say that it is simply God's loving something that makes it right, then what sense would it make to say God wants us to do right?" and he also points our that saying God is good is meaning, "God does what he pleases".
Theodore Schick (1997) examines the problem further by paralleling an unlikely detractor of DCT, Leibniz:
...if things are neither right nor wrong independently of God's will, then God cannot choose one thing over another because it is right. Thus, if he does choose one over another, his choice must be arbitrary. But a being whose decisions are arbitrary is not a being worthy of worship.
Even John Hick (1973) concedes the solution to the problem itself is fallacious:
Perhaps the most promising resolution of the dilemma is a frankly circular one. Good is a relational concept, referring to the fulfillment of a being's nature and basic desires. When humans call God good, they mean that his existence and activity constitute the condition of man's highest good. The presupposition of such a belief is that God has made human nature in such as way that his highest good is to be found in relation to God. Ethics and value theory in general are independent of religion in that their principles can be formulated without any mention of God; yet they ultimately rest upon the character of God, who has endowed man with the nature who fulfillment defines his good.
For many though, the independence of something from God's influence is to take away from His supposed attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and so on. Steven Cahn (1996) sums it up saying:
To act morally is not to act out of fear of punishment; it is not to act as one is commanded to act. Rather, it is to act as one ought to act. And how one ought to act is not dependent upon anyone's power, even if the power be Divine.
There is also instances where what one might consider universally immoral in societies in the majority are considered "good". One example of a gross divergence from what we consider to be moral is pointed out by Howard Bloom (1995), when he remarks on the ethnographer Napoleon Chagnon's observations of an Amazonian people called the Yanomamo which Chagnon referred to as "the fierce people":
The pride themselves on cruelty, glorying in it so enthusiastically that they make a great show of beating their wives. And the wives are as much a part of this viciousness as the husbands. A spouse who does not carry enough scars from her husband's blows feel rejected and complains miserably about her unbruised condition. It is a sign, she is certain, that her husband does not love her.
In our society, spousal abuse is considered morally wrong and legally punishable. However, in the Yanomamo's society it is a show of affection no matter how odd we see it.
All this would suggest that we have an ingrained propensity toward certain behaviors we have labeled "moral" yet in our complex societies these templates are modified and vary from one group to another. This can be analogized with the idea of providing a general template to start with and then each group puts it's own variation upon that foundation which is what would be referred to as a relativistic view of morality.
References
(In order of appearance):
Di Leo, J. (2002). Morality Matters: Race, Class, and Gender in Applied Ethics. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Palmer, J. and Palmer, L. (2002). Evolutionary Psychology: The Ultimate Origins of Human Behavior. Boston: Pearson Education.
Evans, D. and Zarate, O. (1999). Introducing: Evolutionary Psychology. Duxford: Icon Books.
Barkow, J., Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (1992). The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York: Oxford U.P.
Lieberman, D., Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (2003). Does morality have a biological basis? An empirical test of the factors governing moral sentiments relating to incest. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London - Series B, 270, 819-826.
Pinker, S. (2002). The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. New York: Viking.
Sagan, C. (1997). Billions and Billions: Thoughts On Life and Death at the Brink of the Millenium. New York: Ballantine Books.
Pennock, R. (1999). Tower of Babel: Evidence Against the New Creationism. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Walster, E. and Piliavin, J. (1972). Equity and the innocent bystander. Journal of Social Issues, 28, 165-189.
Panchanathan, K. and Boyd, R. (2004). Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. Nature, 432[/u], 499-502.
Freud, S. (1961). [i]Civilization and Its Discontents. James Strachey (Trans.). New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
van Schaik, C., Ancrenaz, M., Borgen, G., Galdikas, B., Knott, C., Singleton, I. et al. (2003). Orangutan Cultures and the Evolution of Material Culture. Science, 299, 102-105.
Whiten, A., Horner, V. and de Waal, F. (2005). Conformity to cultural norms of tool use in chimpanzees. Nature, 437, 737-740.
Arthur, J. (1984) Morality, religion, and conscience. In Di Leo, J. (2002) Morality matters: Race, class, and gender in applied ethics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Schick, T. (1997) Morality requires God ... or does it? Free Inquiry 17(3).
Hick, J. (1973) Philosophy of religion. (2nd ed.) Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Cahn, S. (1996) Religion reconsidered. In Bowie, G., Michaels, M. & Solomon, R. (Eds.) Twenty questions: An introduction to philosophy. (3rd ed.). Orlando: Harcourt Brace.
Bloom, H. (1995). The Lucifer principle. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.